Law Enforcement Aspects of Plan Colombia
Donnie R. Marshall Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Department of Justice, before the U.S. Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control
Chairman Grassley, Co-chairman Biden, and other members of the Senate:
I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you today concerning Plan Colombia. I would like first to thank the Caucus for its continued support of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and overall support of drug law enforcement.
Since inception, the Drug Enforcement Administration has participated in the development of U.S. support of Plan Colombia. DEA is a law enforcement agency, and as such, has enjoyed a long tradition of a successful and ever-evolving relationship with our Colombian law enforcement counterparts in targeting, investigating and dismantling significant drug-trafficking organizations of international scope. DEA believes that the international trafficking organizations based in Colombia that smuggle their illegal drugs into our country pose a formidable challenge to the national security of the United States.
DEA TARGETS INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME
DEA's mission is to identify, target, and dismantle the most powerful drug syndicates operating around the world that are responsible for supplying drugs to American communities. The most significant drug syndicates operating today are far more powerful and violent than any organized criminal groups that we have experienced in American law enforcement. Today's major drug syndicates are simply this new century's versions of traditional organized crime mobsters U.S. law enforcement officials have fought since the beginning of the 20th century. Unlike traditional organized crime, however, these new criminals operate on a global scale with transnational networks to conduct illicit enterprises simultaneously in many different countries.
Members of international groups headquartered in Colombia today have at their disposal the most sophisticated communications technology as well as faxes, Internet, and other communications equipment. Additionally, they have in their arsenal radar-equipped aircraft, weapons and an army of workers who oversee the drug business from its raw beginnings in South American jungles to the urban areas and core city locations within the United States. In addition, these international criminal groups utilize insurgent groups such as the FARC to provide protection for coca fields, processing laboratories, and clandestine airfields. These insurgent groups also provide local transportation services or guarantee safe passage of drug shipments through areas under their control. All of this modern technology and these vast resources enable the leaders of international criminal groups to build organizations which, together with their surrogates operating within the United States, reach into the heartland of America. The leaders of these crime groups in Colombia work through their organizations to carry out the work of transporting drugs into the United States, and franchise others to distribute drugs, thereby allowing them to remain beyond the reach of American justice. Those involved in drug trafficking often generate such tremendous profits that they are able to corrupt law enforcement, military and political officials in order to create and retain a safe haven for themselves.
The international drug syndicates headquartered in Colombia, and operating through Mexico and the Caribbean, control both the sources and the flow of drugs into the United States. The vast majority of the cocaine entering the United States continues to come from the source countries of Colombia, Bolivia and Peru. Approximately 95 percent of the heroin produced in Colombia is shipped to drug markets in the northeastern United States. Recent statistical data indicates that as much as 60 percent of the heroin seized in our nation's ports of entry and analyzed by federal authorities in the United States is of Colombian origin. For the past two decades (up to recent years) criminal syndicates from Colombia ruled the drug trade with an iron fist, increasing their profit margin by controlling the entire continuum of the cocaine market. Their control ranged from the wholesale cocaine base production in Peru, Bolivia and Colombia, to the cocaine hydrochloride (HCl) production and processing centers in Colombia, to the wholesale distribution of cocaine on the streets of the United States.
Colombian traffickers continue to import cocaine base from the jungles of Peru, but in ever-decreasing amounts. Coca-leaf production has increased dramatically within Colombia itself. However, the traffickers move the cocaine to the large cocaine hydrochloride conversion laboratories in Colombia. The vast majority of the cocaine base and cocaine HCl destined for the United States is produced in these laboratories. Many of these activities take place in the southern rainforests and eastern lowlands of Colombia. Most of the coca cultivation in Colombia occurs in the Departments of Guaviare, Caqueta, and Putumayo, areas where there is limited, if any, government control or presence. Cocaine conversion laboratories range from smaller "family" operations to much larger facilities, employing dozens of workers. Once the cocaine HCl is manufactured, it is either shipped via maritime vessel, aircraft, or by land to traffickers in Mexico and thereafter moved across the Southwest border. Alternatively, the cocaine may be shipped through the Caribbean corridor, including the Bahamas Island chain, to U.S. entry points in Puerto Rico, Miami and New York. The FARC controls certain areas of Colombia, and the FARC in those regions generate revenue by "taxing" local drug-related activities. At present, there is no corroborated information that the FARC is involved directly in the shipment of drugs from Colombia to international markets, although we are always watchful for such developments.
CURRENT COLOMBIAN DRUG TRAFFICKING GROUPS
The Drug Enforcement Administration's primary mission is to identify, investigate, disrupt and dismantle major drug-trafficking organizations. Successes against the Medellin and Cali drug lords have accelerated the decentralization of the international cocaine trade. We are now seeing "second-generation" traffickers emerge on the scene as major players in the Colombian cocaine trade. They tend to be less willing to directly challenge government authority and are much more sophisticated in their methods of operation. They employ extensive utilization of wireless communication devices, which they change with great frequency. Other emerging characteristics are the use of computerized communications, elaborate concealment of clandestine cargo, and avoidance of becoming directly involved in retail distribution or even direct distribution to the U.S. market. The successful identification, investigation and prosecution of these violators have become an even greater challenge to law enforcement both in the United States and Colombia.
COCA CULTIVATION AND COCAINE PRODUCTION IN COLOMBIA
In recent years, DEA has observed dramatic changes in coca cultivation and cocaine production. These changing dynamics highlight the fact that Colombian cocaine-trafficking organizations continue to dominate the international cocaine trade. Colombia has always been (and remains) the world's number-one producer of finished cocaine HCI. As recently as 1995, however, Colombia only produced about one-quarter of the world's cocaine base. Colombian traffickers were dependent on Peruvian and Bolivian sources for two-thirds of their cocaine base. Each year, hundreds of tons of cocaine base were imported by aircraft from Peru and Bolivia.
Since 1995, however, net coca cultivation in Colombia has more than doubled from 50,000 hectares in 1995 to 136,200 hectares in 2000. Scientific fieldwork carried out in Colombia from early 1999 through mid-2000 (as part of DEA's Operation Breakthrough Program) has had a dramatic impact on our understanding of the Colombian cocaine threat. Using an updated production formula based on Operation Breakthrough results, the United States estimated that Colombia's potential cocaine production in 2000 was approximately 580 metric tons. This was sharply higher than in previous years. Accordingly, Colombian traffickers are now far less dependent on Peruvian or Bolivian cocaine base sources of supply.
The explosion in Colombia's potential cocaine production notwithstanding, total Andean Region cocaine production has actually declined in recent years, from 930 metric tons in 1995 to 768 metric tons in 2000. This net decrease is due to unprecedented coca eradication and successful law enforcement operations targeting essential chemicals in Bolivia and Peru. In 1997, Bolivia's government implemented the Dignity Plan, which has all but eliminated illicit cocaine cultivation in the Chapare jungle. Bolivia's potential cocaine production decreased from 240 metric tons in 1995 to 43 metric tons in 2000. Additionally, DEA field reporting and laboratory analysis indicates that the purity of Bolivian cocaine has dropped significantly while local base prices have risen, an indication of reduced availability. Much of Bolivia's cocaine is now believed to be either consumed in Brazil or shipped through Brazil to Europe.
In Peru, cocaine production decreased from an estimated 460 metric tons in 1995 to 145 metric tons in 2000. This was in part due to Peru's air interdiction program, which shut down the cocaine "airbridge" between Bolivia, Peru and Colombia. This resulted in a drop in coca prices, taking the profitability out of coca cultivation. However, we are concerned about a new development; in 2000, replanting was detected in previously abandoned fields, causing speculation that coca-leaf cultivation may be on the rise.
PLAN COLOMBIA AND REGIONAL "SPILL-OVER"
DEA has been developing and promoting a regional strategy in terms of our intelligence-gathering and investigation methods. Realizing that drug traffickers do not respect borders, DEA has been instrumental in encouraging countries to work investigations and conduct operations across their common borders. We will be furthering this strategy throughout the region, having designated "multi-regional investigations and operations" as the theme of this year's International Drug Enforcement Conference (IDEC), being held April 3-5 in the Dominican Republic.
DEA, along with other U.S. agencies, is working with all the countries in the region to monitor, detect and react to possible Plan Colombia spill-over. For example, Bolivia has created a comprehensive plan integrating intelligence collection, border-control initiative, investigations, and administrative judicial reforms. Brazil has developed a Brazil-Colombia border intelligence-collection project. Ecuador has initiated plans to better monitor the movement of drugs, chemicals and people from southern Colombia into northern Ecuador.
Now that the Colombian government has significantly expanded and sustained aerial coca-eradication operations into southern Colombia, DEA anticipates that initial "spill-over effect" in coca cultivation will be limited to Colombia. As expected, coca cultivation back in the traditional growing areas of central Colombia (the Guaviare) as well as expanded new cultivation in northern Colombia (Norte de Santander) has already been detected.
Likewise, when the Colombian government is able to expand and sustain coca-eradication operations in central and northern Colombia, while sustaining pressure on southern Colombia (a challenge which may require some time to achieve), some of Colombia's coca cultivation and cocaine-processing might be driven into Ecuador and Venezuela. This has not yet been detected. Traffickers would also be expected to encourage expanded coca cultivation and cocaine production in Peru and Bolivia, two countries that collectively produced about two-thirds of the world's cocaine base as recently as 1995, as mentioned earlier. In order to effectively address the changing dynamics of the drug trade resulting from Colombia's success, a balanced approach would include, in addition to eradication, focusing on these other elements of organized drug trafficking: transportation, chemicals, and distribution networks, and command-and-control of trafficking organizations.
INSURGENT INVOLVEMENT IN THE DRUG TRADE
DEA is concerned about the connection between the FARC and other groups in Colombia and the drug trade. The Colombian government is now engaged in responding to this challenge. DEA will continue to closely monitor the situation.
A required alliance between guerrillas and drug traffickers is nothing new. Since the 1970s, drug traffickers based in Colombia have been forced to develop temporary alliances with leftist guerrillas, or with right-wing paramilitary groups, which charge a surtax for protection and other parasitic services. In some cases, this has been done to secure protection for drug-trafficking interests. At other times, the drug traffickers have financed their own private armies to provide security services. Some insurgent and paramilitary groups have, in fact, become little more than bands of well-armed thugs extorting a fee for their services to drug traffickers.
The presence of the insurgents in Colombia's eastern lowlands and southern rainforest (the country's primary coca-cultivation and cocaine-processing regions) hinders the Colombian Government's ability to conduct counter-drug operations. The frequent ground-fire sustained by Colombian National Police eradication aircraft operating in insurgent-occupied areas shows the extent to which some insurgent units will go to protect the economic interests of their "local constituents" (i.e., coca farmers and drug traffickers). Likewise, insurgent attacks continue to pose a threat to CNP personnel, supported by the DEA, while conducting operations against clandestine laboratories. In some cases, the insurgents protect cocaine laboratories in southern Colombia in return for cash payments or possibly in exchange for weapons.
The most recent DEA reporting indicates that some FARC units in southern Colombia are indeed involved in drug-trafficking activities, such as controlling local cocaine base markets. Some insurgent units have assisted drug-trafficking groups in transporting and storing cocaine and marijuana within Colombia. In particular, some insurgent units protect clandestine airstrips in southern Colombia. However, despite the fact that uncorroborated information from other law enforcement agencies does indicate nexus between certain traffickers and the FARC, there is no evidence that any FARC or ELN units have established international transportation, wholesale distribution, or drug money-laundering networks in the United States or Europe.
Northern and central Colombia continue to be the primary base of operations for paramilitary groups. Recent reporting, however, indicates that paramilitary groups have become more active in southern Colombia. Most of these paramilitary groups do not appear to be directly involved in any significant coca, opium poppy, or marijuana cultivation. Paramilitary leader Carlos Castaño has recently admitted in open press, however, that his group receives payments, similar to the taxes levied by the FARC from coca growers in southern Colombia in exchange for protection from guerrillas.
Several paramilitary groups also raise funds through extortion, or by protecting laboratory operations in northern and central Colombia. The Carlos Castaño organization (and possibly other paramilitary groups) appears to be directly involved in processing cocaine. At least one of these paramilitary groups appears to be involved in exporting cocaine from Colombia.
DEA reporting indicates that some Colombian traffickers are transporting cocaine base out of Colombia's Putumayo Department through northern Ecuador and into Colombia's Nariño Department in an effort to avoid insurgent interference and taxation. Some Colombian traffickers reportedly also use the reverse route (from Nariño to Putumayo via northern Ecuador) to smuggle into Colombia the essential chemicals used to produce cocaine.
DEA PARTICIPATION IN PLAN COLOMBIA
As you are aware, neither DEA nor any other law enforcement agency has received any direct appropriations under the U.S. emergency supplemental appropriation for Plan Colombia. The funding provided is intended to support programs as opposed to specific agencies. Along these lines, DEA has been an active and major participant in the planning and implementation of projects included in the funding of $88 million allocated to the Justice Sector Reform projects of Plan Colombia. DEA's efforts are coordinated through the Department of Justice Criminal Division, which acts in partnership with the Department of the Treasury's Office of Enforcement. DEA, in collaboration with our Justice and Treasury Department enforcement counterparts, has participated in the development of a comprehensive and integrated Justice Sector Reform Program. DEA will serve as the lead agency in project implementation, or as a substantial partner in combined efforts with our U.S. and Colombian counterparts. Projects such as the multilateral case initiative, the enhanced and expanded Colombian specialized vetted unit program, the cellular telephone interception facility, enhanced and expanded forensic programs, and a variety of prosecutor and police training programs, while focused on supporting our Colombian counterparts, will also directly and substantially support and enhance DEA's efforts in Colombia and throughout the region. These projects reinforce DEA's focus on attacking the major criminal organizations that cause the greatest harm to Colombia and the U.S., and also focus on the importance of a regional effort.
In particular, DEA will serve as the lead implementing agency in the establishment of a cellular telephone interception facility in Colombia. The facility will enhance the capabilities of Colombian law enforcement authorities to conduct telephone intercept investigations properly authorized under Colombian law.
For a number of years, the DEA in Colombia has provided technical material support and personnel resources to various Colombian law enforcement units of the Colombian National Police (CNP), the Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (DAS), and the Cuerpo Tecnico de Investigaciones (CTI) in furtherance of hard-line telephone intercept initiatives. These units operate in most of the major metropolitan cities in Colombia. In recent years, this program has expanded to enhance the investigative capabilities of Colombia's law enforcement agencies. Computer equipment, computer software, and funding will allow these units to more effectively conduct investigations against major drug-trafficking organizations.
Intelligence and evidence obtained by these units from wire intercepts have been used to support the prosecution of drug traffickers, advance active investigations, and provide leads on bilateral Colombian/United States investigations. While there have been major investigative successes, there have been severe technical limitations on overall enforcement effectiveness.
The ability to effectively intercept communications has been seriously limited due to a variety of factors such as the lack of modem equipment and the inability to establish monitoring sites in certain areas of the country. The equipment to be obtained through funding provided by Plan Colombia will make significant strides to close this technology gap between drug traffickers and law enforcement authorities in Colombia.
We are extremely pleased with the commitment shown by the government of Colombia to re-institute one of the most effective judicial tools against Colombian drug traffickers, that of extradition. The Extradition Reform Act of the Colombian Constitution, which allows for the extradition of Colombian nationals for crimes committed after the date of enactment, entered into force on December 17, 1997. Since that time, we have successfully extradited 13 Colombian nationals to face justice in the United States. Among the extradited include significant violators such as Jorge Asprilla-Perea and Alberto Orlandez-Gamboa, as well as five defendants from the highly successful Operation Millennium, which culminated in October 1999.
Two recent Colombian Constitutional Court decisions, however, require that Colombian law enforcement authorities determine whether a criminal case in Colombia should be opened against the subject for whom extradition is sought. These decisions raise two potential problems. First, if a case is opened by Colombian authorities, the extradition could be delayed until the investigation, prosecution and sentencing of the subject is complete. Second, if a subject is convicted of the same crime in Colombia as is being charged in the United States, the prospect of "double jeopardy" might impede extradition. Although the actual impact of these decisions on pending or future extradition requests remains to be seen, any impediment to our renewed and exemplary extradition relationship will be a major setback.
OVERVIEW OF PRIORITIES AND PROGRAMS
Due to the precarious and ever-changing dynamics of the cocaine trade in South America, the DEA Bogota Country Office (BCO), in conjunction with the American Embassy in Colombia, developed strategies to identify, investigate and dismantle major drug-trafficking organizations. The DEA South American Regional Plan (SARP) and the United States Mission Performance Plan (MPP) are the primary strategies developed by the BCO and U.S. Embassy in Colombia to guide the U.S. counter-drug efforts in Colombia. In essence, the SARP and the MPP prioritize targeting the significant drug-trafficking organizations operating throughout Colombia.
In implementing these plans, the BCO operates on the premise that the organizations controlling the manufacture and transportation of cocaine HCl are the most vulnerable elements of the drug-trafficking organizations. As such, the BCO directs available resources at these factions in an effort to identify and ultimately immobilize them.
Using this strategy, the BCO will enhance resources in the area known as the Colombian Source Zone. This is an area southeast of the Andes mountains characterized by few roads, no rail transportation, very little commercial air traffic, many clandestine airstrips and an extensive river system linking this area to Peru, Brazil and Venezuela. The BCO and United States Country Team believe that by augmenting resources in the Colombian Source Zone, the amount of cocaine HCl available for transportation to the United States will be significantly reduced.
The BCO will continue to direct assets and resources at the command-and-control structures of major drug-trafficking organizations operating throughout Colombia. These organizations operate primarily northwest of the Andes Mountains and throughout major Colombian cities. These organizations also control transportation of cocaine HCl from the Colombian Transit Zone (that area adjacent to both Colombian coasts) to the United States, as well as other countries, for eventual distribution.
As alluded to earlier, the BCO has noted a significant increase in seizures of Colombian heroin, both in Colombia and the United States. The BCO will strengthen its resources dedicated to targeting the organizations controlling the manufacture and transportation of heroin from Colombia to the United States.
All BCO programs will focus on the identification and immobilization of major drug-trafficking organizations operating throughout Colombia. To further augment these objectives, programs such as the Andean Initiative, Sensitive Investigations Unit and Intelligence Collection will be the primary support for the BCO's enforcement efforts.
Furthermore, the Sensitive Investigation Units, Heroin Task Force, Operation Selva Verde and other law enforcement entities such as DAS and CTI, are tasked to initiate significant investigations targeting the command-and-control structure of the major drug-trafficking organizations. These units target organizations operating in the Colombian Source Zone and other areas of Colombia. The units work simultaneously with DEA domestic offices in coordinated transnational investigations targeting all aspects of these organizations so as to maximize both the effect and the return on the investment.
The United States is also assisting with programs to help the police, Colombian Customs (DIAN), prosecutors, and judiciary, as well as civil society. Programs focus on human rights, prisons, airport and seaport/maritime security, Customs interdiction, inspection techniques, land-border interdiction, investigative techniques, and reform of the criminal code. DEA, Customs, and the U.S. Coast Guard are involved in rendering this assistance.
With respect to U.S. Customs, I saw first-hand last week the critical role that the Customs P-3 aircraft play in the region. Plan Colombia provides $68 million for Customs to upgrade four of its oldest P-3 Airborne Early Warning (DOME) aircraft with the latest generation radar, the APS 145. This radar modernization will ensure Customs continued robust support to source country interdiction efforts, and Plan Colombia specifically.
RECENT BILATERAL INVESTIGATIVE SUCCESSES
Operation White Horse
The Operation White Horse investigation targeted a large-scale heroin-trafficking organization, directed by Wilson Salazar-Maldonado, responsible for sending multi-kilogram quantities of heroin from Colombia to the Northeastern United States via Aruba. The investigation was conducted jointly by the CNP, DEA Bogota, Curacao, Philadelphia and New York, and the Special Operations Division. This investigation resulted in 96 arrests, the seizures of multi- kilograms of heroin and cocaine, weapons and U.S. currency. The investigation began in September 2000, and culminated on January 18, 2001.
Operation Broker II
An investigation conducted by the Departamento Administrativo de Investigaciones (DAS) SIU in conjunction with DEA targeted a Colombian money-laundering organization connected to the Colon Free Zone, Panama. This organization has been involved in the black-market peso exchange through the importation of precious metals and jewels into Colombia in exchange for drug-related proceeds.
On February 1, 2001, acting on DEA information, the DAS arrested four pilots and seized two airplanes in the city of Medellin, Colombia, upon their arrival from Panama. A search of the aircraft revealed approximately $600,000 worth of gold and silver concealed within the planes.
On February 19, 2001, the DAS conducted a round-up of defendants implicated in money-laundering violations as a result of this investigation. A total of 21 persons were arrested with seizures of two additional airplanes, approximately $100,000 in currency, $110,000 worth of jewelry and 12 weapons.
Operation Seis Fronteras
Between November 13 and November 28, 2000, six South and Central American countries joined forces to conduct an international enforcement operation aimed at disrupting the flow of precursor chemicals. The participating countries included Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Panama, Brazil and Ecuador. Participating agencies conducted searches and inspections of chemical supply companies, land and maritime transportation companies, warehouses, and clandestine laboratory sites.
Operation New Generation
In November 2000, the CNP, with assistance from DEA, dismantled the Carlos Mario Castro-Arias cocaine-trafficking and money-laundering organization. The operation, dubbed "Operation New Generation," resulted in the execution of over 100 arrest/search warrants and the arrest of at least 45 suspects in Colombia (and eight in the U.S.). Prior to the takedown, the Medellin-based organization was responsible for the transportation of multi-ton quantities of cocaine from Colombia to Mexico and the United States. In October 2000, the CNP seized 450 kilograms of cocaine from the Castro Arias organization that was secreted in heavy machinery in a warehouse in Cali.
CONCLUSION: HOPE FOR THE FUTURE
We can and should continue to identify and build cases against the leaders of the new criminal groups from Colombia. These criminals have already moved to make our task more difficult by withdrawing from positions of vulnerability and maintaining a much lower profile than their predecessors did. A number of initiatives hold particular promise for success:
The special program of vetted units, funded by the U.S. Congress under the Vetted Unit Initiative, continues to make it possible to convert existing partially vetted units of the CNP into fully vetted teams. These teams of investigators will work closely with DEA and will conduct high-level drug investigations in Colombia and the region without fear of compromise. This program is, by far, our most important investigative tool.
We intend to carry out even more of the cutting-edge, sophisticated investigations like White Horse and Millennium, as part of a joint DOJ Criminal Division/DEA bilateral case initiative with our Colombian counterparts. Such operations benefit from the closest possible cooperation between the DEA and CNP. These investigations will continue to lead to the dismantling of major portions of the most significant drug-trafficking organizations operating in Colombia today. Operation Millennium successfully targeted major traffickers who had previously operated without fear of capture or prosecution in the United States, believing that only their low-level operatives were at risk. These operations effectively demonstrated that even the highest-level traffickers based in foreign countries could not manage drug operations inside the United States with impunity. Operation Millennium was made possible by direct support from the governments of Colombia and Mexico. These operations underscore the importance of cooperation among international drug law enforcement agencies.
DEA will continue to work closely with specially trained and vetted Colombian task force units to develop joint cases, such as Operation Millennium. The Justice Initiative portion of Plan Colombia provides for specific support for these types of initiatives, including training and support for a counter-narcotics task force and an anti-money laundering and asset forfeiture task force. We look forward to supporting these training programs and then working with our Colombian counterparts in the day-to-day investigative work.
The government of Colombia faces dramatic challenges to the rule of law, many of which are directly related to drug trafficking. Plan Colombia addresses many of these challenges. The support to multilateral investigations, counter-drug units and money-laundering sections of the Justice Initiative portion of Plan Colombia can help DEA, Colombian National Police, DAS and Colombian Prosecutor General's efforts to fight drug trafficking in Colombia. Other sections of the Justice Initiative of Plan Colombia can provide indirect support to DEA, Colombian National Police, DAS and Colombian Prosecutor General's efforts to investigate major Colombian drug-trafficking organizations. These initiatives include support to money-laundering and asset forfeiture, training for police prosecutors and judges, security for victims and witnesses, prison assistance and procedural and legislative reforms to the Colombian legal system.
The DEA remains committed to our primary goal of targeting and arresting the most significant drug traffickers in the world today. In particular, we will continue to work in close partnership with our counterparts in Colombia. This is a partnership in which we have invested substantial time and resources for the past twenty years, and which has yielded great success. These successes include the previously mentioned investigations, and the demise of the Cali and Medellin cartels. The ultimate test of success will come when we bring to justice the drug lords who control their vast empires of crime which bring misery to so many nations. They must be arrested, tried and convicted, and sentenced in their own countries to prison terms commensurate with their crimes, or, as appropriate, extradited to the United States to face justice in U.S. courts. Plan Colombia's emphasis on bringing the Colombian military into the fight against drugs is laudable, and necessary. At the same time, we must continue to aggressively support civilian anti-drug units such as the CNP. No one agency or country can win this fight alone.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Caucus today.
February 28, 2001